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I:; TflL SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Jl.l\r<SE':'c; Fl\RM SUPPLY. JNC. 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
l'l\llL FJELDSTED dba 
F.kldstcd Oil Co., 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18989 
S1 ATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plarn tiff - Respondent brought this action to recover amounts owed by 
Deft·r.c.lant-Appellant on an open account with Plaintiff-Respondent, alleging 
fuP1 been delivered to Defendant-Appellant's place of business. 
DJSPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
r11v CZiSC was tried to the bench on Januetry 5, 1983, and the Honorable 
Jud Doll V. Tibbs ruled m favor of Respondent. Appellant has appealed 
l tll l 1 1 :d1 Supremt Court. 
RELJEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
l<"'f"""ient seeks to have the ruling of the Trial Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1 ·,(.1( •,d:-1r.t is an owner/operator of a retail outlet for petroleum 
J,,, 1· wJ.,, lias had a long standing open account with Plaintiff-Respondent, 
a corporat1on which pl 11-u!\·urT1 tiruduct:-; oJ. .1 v. l1lilt':-:.dll' Ji. 1 
to retailers. Appe1lJ.nt has h1.c.toricJ.llv m;irlt· 11\HT1( 1·(iu:- purch.i:--L':-- (JJ fH 
products from Respondcllt on credit. Respolldcnt billed J\ppl'llc"d 0 ,, " 
monthly basis based on in\'oices, m,:iny of whJch WC'Yl' un:->1f:T1ed, th,_d 11 ,_ 
the individual deliveries. 
It was stipulated by the parties that of the hur1dreds of scpc1r"t' 1 , '" 
actions occurring in the period of time set forth rn the Compl;iii,t. foui o\w 
invoices comprised the unpaid and disputed balance of th<> uccour1t. Or,e u 
these was found to be an improper charge arid was disallowed. The 1csue 
at triai was limited to whether the fuel represented bv the rnna11.1nll three 
invoices was delivered to the Appe 11ant. 
Respondent's president testified that because of the fuel J"r 
the time oer10d 111 question (T-17: 14-16) Appellant had placed a stancll!,8 uL 
for all the fuel that Respondent could deliver (T-24: 3-13; 25: 16-171. Tl"· 
was not denied by Appellant. Appellant also admitted that it \\as ruJ' 
unusual for direct deliveries to be made to his business csl<:ihl:sh11"",i 
(T-39: 11-22) and that frequently hE" ordi=r<:d, received ;:ir1d paid !or rn·,1, · 
items based on ur1signed invoices (T-40: 22-41: 20J. 
Resp0r1dent 1s prec:.idf'nt a1so testified, and subst.011iticitf'd bY ol1 1TlLC 
evidence its own invoices. that he was present w}ic11 tht.· r]\ '1\ (' 
were actually mddE (Tl 31: 1-8) pur:::-.uar1t to tht-' (ird· 1 
Appel1ar1t had with Rt!c:.j,CJT•d·-'fJt. ;=dso ()ff,·rt·d 1111!> 1 1rJi_·r,, 
delivery ticket prepared bv a third l,;,rty. Oil Procl11< t . ·' l'1< f, 
Respondent 1s prt.:s]dent tc-stifit'd he iriitict.1ll·d to ctckrJowlL·dgv d,·l1\ \_'f\ :d : 
t11, tlw rlc-]1\·crv \Vd:) rnctdc. This document was admitted into evidence by 
11 · l 1 ul J udµc· m,dc·r the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T!!E Bl;SJNESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT 
'.)J'LCIFY THAT RECORDS PREPARED BY A THIRD PARTY WHO IS NEITHER 
!\N EMPLOYEE NOR AGENT OF THE PROFFERING PARTY ARE INADMISSIBLE 
SOLEL 1 BECAUSE OF THAT FACT. 
Rule 63(13). Rules of Evidence (Utah 1971) makes no distinction between 
1·<·cords which were prepared by the proffering party or its employees or agents 
ctn d records which were prepared by some other third party. It merely lays 
out cntcnc., which if met by busir1ess record, allow that record to be 
;,dm1tt<·cl into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. All that is required 
oJ a writ mg is ( 1) that it be offered as a m<:morandum or record of an act or 
event rn order to prove the facts stated therein, and ( 2) that the judge make 
" Jc\l'.rmrnalwn that it meets certain standards of reliabilitv and obJectivitv 
s"ch as being ''made in the regular course of business at or about the time 
uf the ctct'', etc. 
The Judge: is to be given cons1derctble d.J.scret1on in admitt1ng or re.iecting 
'.·•Jc), n·1dv11cc. ])ambrough ·1:. Bethers, 552 P. Zd 1286, 1290 ( 1976). 
;i]:-;(1, Sf1orC'lint Proµ. lnc.. v. Deer-0-Pajnts & Chem. Ltd., 24 Ariz. App. 
·, '· i. c, lh P. Zd !GO. 760 ( 1975). If the iucige finds a documem meets the criteria 
(1'. tl11 liu.'->1ness record.'=> exception, it should be admitted regGt:rd1ess of whether 
,,, , 0 ,,r,·cl b) thE> proffering party or a third part\· and the trial court's 
'·'""1!d <mh· be overturned after a clear showing that the trial judge 
PU!f\ I II 
THERE ARE NUMEROUS EXA'.1PLES CH COl'I\ Is l\IJ <Jl\llS 
PREPARED BY A THIRD PAkTY llNULR fill P.llSif\J·:ss RFCORflS U:C.U' l ll• 
TO THE HEARSAY RULE, AND TJIIS COUR 1 SHOULD !JO Llf:J \1'Jc,J. Jf, J llh 
CASE. 
Appellant is correct in his assert101i that Ut'1h casc·s to datl' h:tn· ror.]\ 
dealt with fact situations whcrem the record sought to Le admitted '" ,],.,. i;,., 
business records exception to the hear»dy rule had b<ceti prepan·d 1,v ar. 
agent or employee withm the business entrty proffcruig it. 
however, have a1lowed records by disir1terested third pa.1·t1l'-"' 1<1 be 
admitted under this exception if they mL't the criteria laid uut 11, tl1L' .rult.. 
See DeHart v. Allen, 26 C.2d 829. ](.,] P.2d 453 (Cal. 1945), (documc·rit !"• 
by a process server was ctdmitted in a suit bct\\t·er1 a lessor arid ::1 
ln re Davie's Estate. 152 Kan. 23, 103 P.2d 52 (1940), (n·cordo, fH<·J>;,n·J "' 
priests of the Catholic Church wcere admrtted to show certain facts about 
intestate's alleµed father). Hospital records have also bt-en aclm1ttl'd u11dcr 
this exception by many surrounding jurisdictions in cases wert' tllt' hu.<->f!lLL 
was a dis1nterested th1rd partv. Sec 7'.e1-lnnus v. P.2c.J ,,;..,( 
(Alaska 1964); Good v. A. B. Ch:rnce Co .. 565 P.2d 217 (Cnlu.A;>p. 1r,,·,,, 
Boulden v. Britton. 86 N.111. 775. 527 P.Zd 1087 (1974); Sw\'dct•, K 
531 P.2d 1031 (Okla. 1975): Mavor v. Dowsc-tt. 240 Or. 1%; .1[1,, .'1' 
(1965); 'd 
(1967); Jn re rv1orton 1s Estate, P.:::'.d (\\-yu. 
ln a case s1mllctr tu thl 
of an open account, the Suprcrnt' l:cn1rt ,t11owt·cl 1r1 d cl<)( 1J:'1• t J 
by a disinterested third party under the bt1'->1t1t·:--,.'-> ( .,,\ l·; 1 il< 1 11 11 • tl,• 
[,1 lt ',,\ \" l"lllt· \',,1, llcus"r .. lrrc. v. Korn, 204 Kan. 172, 460 P.Zd 
',.1 • I I 'J(,9). Ir, th.<t th« rC'port of a credit reporting agency was allowed 
111 tr• :-,how th·· dl'fl·r1d:n1t h:id made representations as to his willingness to 
,,s'11m1· respor.s1hility for the· debts of his son's clothing store. 
Sl'vvral of the cited ctbovc relied on the lJniform Business Records 
as Evidence Act. Paragraph 2 thereof states: 
1'A rcc_ord of an act, cond1t1or1 or event. shall, in so far as 
rl'levant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other 
qualified witness testifies as to its identity and the mode of 
its prc•pccration, and if it was made in the regular course of 
business. at or rJear the time of the act, coridition or event, 
and if. in the opinion of thP court. the sources of information, 
method and time of preparat101J were such as to justify its 
1 
Althuul.'h the lar,guage is r.o'. iclcr.tical to that found in Rule 63 (13), 
P.ules of Evidence (Utah 1971), the criteria to be met is basically the same, 
i.e., v..ritings which were made in the regular course of a Uusiness, at or 
;:,bout the lime of the occ;yrrence, ar.d as to their reliability and 
ti ustworth1nc-ss. Neither the Uniform Act nor the Utah Rule specifies that 
ttrc- pcirty profferinf! the document must be the creator, but onlv that if 
t }i, cntenei are met. the- documer1t is tv be admitted. In this case, the 
cn1eria WLTt· met thl· document was properly admitted. 
lri 1hL' at bar. the Pxhjbit n1 question was admittedly prepared by a 
tL1rd P"rtv (T-27:8-10). fiowever, it was also established that E1·val Hansen 
,,, (1r, ],,,half of Respor1dt'r1t was prt>scnt when the delivery was made 
\ J I.' 14J. "' kr"rnled""d the n·cc1pt of the fuel at the time of delivery 
'>\' rr,111 • .Jlrnl! the exh1b1t in question (Tl8: 12-17; 20:8-14), and that this was 
l1n 1· Jr' the 0rci1I1ctrv course of RC'spondent 1s business (T27: 15-17). 
Ht·:-.n(l11dc,rit 1s w1trit·ss tPst1f1t->d th3t hP wJ.s physically present when the 
initialling the delivery ticket at tlw 11111<· o! 111<· ,,, t 
incorporating that delivery ticket into n.:_'/:!Ulctr coursl' uf ln 1.c., 11 , 
and by actually witnessing the deli\'cry, \\'Jtncss was also <tllk ill 
determine the trustworthiness of the documei1t. 
There is adequate evidence to support the trial judge's findrngs th"t the 
evidence which Appellant sought to exclude met the criteria of Rule 63 ( J j). 
Rules of Evidence (Utah 1971) and was therefore properly admitted. Gi,·mg 
the deference due the trial judge's discretion as discussed in Point I ;;bove. 
it is clear that the admission of the evidence in quc stion should be u;,Jwld. 
There has been insufficient showing that the trial judge so abusc·d his discrct, 0 :, 
as to justify overturning his ruling. 
In this case, the Utah Supreme Court should follow the precedent set 
in other jurisdictions and affirm the admission of a qualified business record 
prepared by a disinterested third party under the business records C'.C1 ;11F1·. 
to the hearsay rule. This is particula.rly so where Respolldent m6dv :n, n.tn 
of its own to the document by in1tialhnu 1t and thereby acknow]edgir1'd.. rLc1::·1pl 
of the product for its own records. 
"OlNT Ill 
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE IN QliESTION WAS IMPROPERLY l\DMJT f}_D, TliL 
ERROR \\'AS HARMLESS AND THE TRIAL COURT'S RL1LlNG SHOULD Ri: i 
Rule 61, Rules of Civil Procedure· (Utah 1W53) statc·s: 
11 No error in either the .-dJr,11:-,s1or1 ur 1ht· e-xc1usiun of 1-\ HJr·rJl < • 
and no l·rror or defect ui a11y ru.ir1g ur orUer or u1 dfJ\ 
done or om)t1ed by the: court or liy any of thl' p<1rllcs, i::, gr-'n1r1l1 
for granting a. new trial or othcrw1se d1sturb1ng ,1 or 
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the Lourt 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at everv ::.>tctv<· 
of the proceed1ng must disref:!:ard anv error or Uef('ct ir1 tnv 
pruu .. Tcl1TJ.g which d(ws riut <.iffcct the substantial rights of 
t 11(' fJ:1rtic:-,.' 
lic ;, Jtll"V tndl. the Ute!h Supreme Court recently elaborated on this 
'Assuming argucndo that the trial court erred in admitting 
Dr. Lee's testimony. such error does not rise to the level of 
prciudicial error urciess there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the would have reached a different result if the error 
h;,d not occurred." Dowland v. Lvman Products for Shooters, 
6·1c P.2d 380, 3Bl (Utah 1982) 
The principle that an even more substantial error must occur before 
rulrng in a non-jury trial will be reversed has been well established for 
r:cny yc<lrS. In '.'_pratt v-. Paulson, 49 Ut. 9, 161 P. 1120, 1122 (Utah 1916), 
t ht· Court saici: 
, ... if the; c;:;se had been tried by a jurv instead of by the court, 
therv v.ould be no doubt respectrng our duty to reverse the case 
upor; the ground that improper evidence was admitted against 
the ddendant over his obJections and exceptions which were 
[JYeJuclicial to his substarit1al rights. In view, however, that the 
c was tried by the court, it is rns1sted by plaintiff that 
c.lthough it were conceded the court erred in the particulars 
rnst slatted, vet that there is at least some substantial evidence 
ir1 support of the materia1 findings, and hence we may not 
iriterlcre. Counsel enc and rely upon the case of Victoria. etc. 
Cu. v. Haws, 7 Utah 515, 27 Pac. 695, where the court lays down 
th•· cJuctrir1f-' coritt·rided for in the fo11o\ving words: 
'Wl1e1. the judge tr1es a cast without a jury, it is not a reversible 
vrror to ir1competent, irrelevant, or immaterial evidence; 
for t1e deciues the on thto proper testimony only. and disregards 
r-r1111·LJY that which is 111comnPtt'nt. irrelevant, and immaterial. When 
tlil' c .. it',ar prf'pondt-'rance of relevant, and material evidence 
1ht· f1·vlir1gs. this court \vill not reverse because of errors 
uf the court bck>\"-' iri admltting incompetent, irrelevant, or immaterial 
e\·idt_'11ce, for the p1·l;sumption ifl such case is that it was wholly 
1
" 
[· ic 1,nlikely th;,t Appellant car1 meet even the standard required in a 
1ur\ ti-1;11 tCi cnrnne1 an ovE'rturn1ng of the trial court 1s ruling let alone the 
h 1 c he.,- st;rn cfard rf'ciuired for non-jury trials. The only attempt Appellant 
7 
made to refute Respondent's al1cgc1t1orts w,1::- 1J\\ 1. th;:it Oil <J 1 
was never made (T-38:2-3). Evcri th1:-i \\d.<-· qu.dlfwd bl·c.1u:-ic he w<1;-, r1.il!ril 
only that he didn't know thty dl·lnL·rcU, nut that he .'>tJJT th(') 
weren't (T-39: 9-10). Appellant did not den\· that h1· hau a standrng urdn 
with Respondent for fuel. He admitted that It was a common practicl' j 01-
him to purchase products on credit from Respondent without si gi 1in g- for 
them (T-41: 12-20), and that other dirc>ct deliveries had becIJ mciclc to h 1,. 
establishment (T-39: 11-17). 
On the other hand, Respondent presented testimony by its presidc1d 
that the deliveries were made ( T-18: 15-17), that ht wa>o w·n,.r1 the 
deliveries were made (T-18: 12-14; 31: 1-8), that htc n,itialcd the cxhilJ1t \\hicL 
is at issue in this appeal at the time of delivery to eek nm\ i<'d/"c th.it 1l1L' 
delivery had actually been made (T-20: 8-14). Respondc·rd >oubst:rntiJtl'd 
this testimony by offering iuto evidence ib own invmces for the same 
deliveries (T-15: 7-19; JS: 24-16: 10; 21: 12-22: 6; 22: 14-15). Resuor1derd aJso 
established that it was a common practice to make deliveries to Aprwlbrd 
without having Appellant sign the invoice by its prc>oident's tcstrn1orl\ 
(T-7: 15-23; 28: 10-16; 29: 20-30: 4) and by Apµcl)z,rd's owr1 dd11.iss1uL 
(T-40: 22-41: 20). 
It is clear that even if Exh:bit #5 was admJttL'ci into t·YICll-r1cc' 11. '1 1·0J 
the error is not prejudjcia1 ctpply1ng either thf-' :Jta:idctrd for .unC's c1 1• ! 11 1 
standard for trial before a iudgc. Because the :ncc.umpt1rn 1s th,d '" 
11' I'., 
the question becomes whether- ;-i p1·cDondcr<lr1c(" of compl'Tl'llt. rt·1 
material evidence supports the finding. If so. thP trirtl r 1 1'." is \( 
be upheld. 
11 this ct sir1gle c.icnying kr1owlcdge of the disputed 
I I 1 ' ] \ ( ' l- i I must bl' Wf·ighcd against an eye-witness 1s testimony of delivery, 
1ili:->L1t.tic1tvd hv invoices which were made in the regular course of 
He:-,ti(1nderit 1 s business and whose trustworthiness was established by 
cxt<'1"1vc testimony (T-7: 15-8: 25; 10: 5-23; 28: 10-16; 29: 20-30: 4; 40: 22-41: 20). 
It is clear that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial Judge's 
fir,drngs, and they should be upheld. 
Rule 61. Rules of Civil Procedure (Utah 1953) is controlling in this 
CdSe. Smee any error which may have occurred does not affect the substantial 
ri12hts of the parties (according to the criteria given in case law as discussed 
above) this court must disregard the error and refuse to disturb the trial 
court's judgment and order. 
CONCLUSION 
The busiT1ess records exccpt10n to the hearsay rule makeo no distinction 
hctv.er,r, records prepared by the proffering party ctnd those prepared by 
d1smtcrested third parties. lt simply lays out criteria. which if met. allow 
lJus111ess document to be admitted into evidenc(; as an exception to the 
rule, Although the Utah Supreme Court hcts not yet addressed the 
rd i1usu1c>ss documents prepared by disinterested third parties, other 
'<".1<·ts h;ivt' recognized this principle. and justice dictates that it should be 
l,, ,,,, if the court finds that Exhibit #S was erroneously admitted, the 
11 1.1; , (Jut·t 1:-, ruling still be afiirmed because the error would not affect 
tr" culi,;tanti;,I 1·ights of the parties. There was ample other evidence given 
9 
respectfu11v r1·quc:::its that 1hc 1-u;1nµ: of the Trial Court l)l ,Lffinned. 
DatL'd tl11s {,th cl.i\· of Jur1c, J'ltn. 
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